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LASHA WN A. v. DIXON: RESPONDING TO THE PLEAS
OF CHILDREN
Many things we need can wait, the child cannot. Now is the time
his bones are being formed, his blood is being made, his mind is

being developed. To him we cannot say tomorrow, his name is
today.'
The foster care system in the United States is in a shambles. 2 A state
welfare agency will take a child away from an abusive home, only to place
the child with a foster family that further abuses the child. 3 These children
have but one wish-to survive. 4 Some children spend the better part of their
childhood in foster homes and suffer mental, emotional, and physical abuse
at the hands of state-appointed foster parents. 5 The unfortunate truth is
that our foster care programs are failing the very people for whom the

I. Gabriela Mistral, Chilean poet, quoted in NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN,
BEYOND RHETOIC: A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIS, Final Report of
the National Commission on Children, at 1 (1991).
2. See BIGHT FUTURES OR BROKEN DREAMS: THE

STATUS OF THE CHILDREN OF THE
DISTRCT OF COLUMBIA AND AN INVESTMENT AGENDA FOR THE 1990's, Report of the Children's

Defense Fund, at 90-116 (1991) [hereinafter BRIGHT FUTURES] (stating that thousands of
children and adolescents are in crisis in District of Columbia and highliihting deficiencies in
foster care program). See generally J.C. Barden, Group Says Violations Pervade CapitalFoster

Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1990, § 1, at 22 (discussing how foster care systems in seven of
twenty-three states reviewed failed to meet legal standards); Michael D'Antonio, Foster-Care
Failings:Abandoned, Abused Kids Stuck in a System Lacking Money-and Families,NEWSDAY,
Dec. 4, 1988, at 5 (discussing how foster care agency fails to meet its responsibilities); Former
Foster Child Tells Panel of Five Lost Years, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1988, § 1, at 53 (stating
that shortcomings of New York City's foster care program are staggering); Foster Care Woes
in Baltimore, N.Y. TinMs, Aug. 2, 1987, § 1, at 44 (reporting on order of judge ruling that
serious deficiencies in foster care system of Baltimore are exposing children to serious risk of
permanent damage); John Hurst, County Accused of Letting Foster Children Suffer Abuse,
L.A. TnEs, Mar. 8, 1990, at A3 (stating that Los Angeles County Department of Children's
Services continuously has failed to protect children in foster care from substandard conditions);
Michael Powell, It's A Scofflaw Budget, NEWSDAY, June 20, 1991, at 7 (illustrating that states
ignore court orders to fund programs such as foster care); Spencer Rich, Lawmakers Fault
HHS on Foster Care: Abuse of Children in Programs Cited, WASH. POST, May 13, 1988, at
A21 (stating that in recent years child welfare and foster care system has faced increasing
problems).
3. See supra note 2 (discussing deficiencies in state foster care programs).
4. Douglas Martin, Where Trail of Tears Ends for the Hard to Place, N.Y. TI.Es,
Nov. 27, 1991, at B4 (depicting life of child who, when asked meaning of life, replied "to
survive").

5. See supra note 2 (discussing abused foster children); see also K.H. ex rel. Murphy
v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 848 (7th Cir. 1990) (depicting foster child discovered to have
contracted gonorrhea from vaginal intercourse when she was seventeen months old); Doe v.
New York City Dep't of Soc. Serv., 709 F.2d 782, 783 (2d Cir.) (depicting foster child
physically and sexually abused by foster father), cert. denied sub nom. Catholic Home Bureau
v. Doe, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
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government designed the systems. Despite the fact that most states and
municipalities are aware of the inadequacies of their foster care programs,
budgetary constraints as well as ineffectual administrative and bureaucratic
6
procedures hamper efficient implementation of the foster care programs.
In an ideal world, the state would be a protective guardian of its abused
children; in our society, however, the state does little to protect its disadvantaged children, and often takes funding away from desperately needed
children's health programs. Because children do not vote, cannot organize
politically, and are incapable of donating financial support to political
figures, the state finds it easy to overlook their needs. 7 Some municipalities

6. See 126 CONG. REc. S6941 (daily ed. June 13, 1980) (statement of Senator Cranston)
(stating that one of country's most serious and well-documented problems with existing foster
care system is tendency for child to become lost in system); see also Paul Taylor, Nonprofits
Boost Advocacy in the Interest of Children, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1992, at Al (discussing
how 32 community foundations across United States have formed loose alliance that will serve
children by engaging in public advocacy, community organization and media campaigns); Paul
Taylor, Plight of Children: Seen but Unheeded, WASH. POST, July 5, 1991, at Al (stating that
while children have become wrenching symbol of social neglect, social policy has not moved
beyond lip service).
7. See Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HAv. EDUc. Rv., 487, 492-493
(1973) (discussing inability of children to secure rights for themselves). Rodham writes
That children's issues are political may seem obvious ... In the United States, the
problems of children have usually been explained without any consideration of
children's proper political status. Accordingly, the obstructionist role of the unstated
consensus and the laws reflecting it has seldom been appreciated. The pretense that
children's issues are somehow above or beyond politics endures and is reinforced by
the belief that families are private, non-political units whose interests subsume those
of children. There is also an abiding belief that any official's failure to do what is
best by a child is the exception, not the rule, and is due solely to occasional errors
of judgment. Moreover, nothing countervails against this pattern, since children are
almost powerless to articulate their own interests or to organize themselves into a
self-interested constituency and adults allied with them have seldom exerted an
appreciable influence within the political system.
Id.
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTIcE (1971) (discussing society's intuitive
convictions of the primacy of justice). In A Theory of Justice, Rawls defines the concept of
justice as
a proper balance between competing claims from a conception of justice as a set of
related principles for identifying the relevant considerations which determine this
balance ... The concept of justice I take to be defined, then, by the role of its
principles in assigning rights and duties and in defining the appropriate division of
social advantages.
Id. at 10.
Applying Rawls' interpretation of justice to the position of children in American society,
it is clear that a proper balance does not exist between rights of children and competing adult
claims. Likewise, Rodham's observations indicate that children have little political status in
America, and as a result are incapable of making their voices heard in the political arena. See
Rodham, Children Under the Law, supra, at 493 (discussing fact that children are almost
powerless to organize politically).
Under Rawls' interpretation of justice, various segments of society should have the ability
to iterate their versions of justice and to voice their concerns in the channels established for
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consciously disregard court orders commanding states to cure the inadequa-

cies of their foster care programs. 8 When economic constraints require
tradeoffs in a state's budget, children's services are usually the first to goafter all, the children cannot fight back. 9 Abused children must depend

upon child activists to voice their concerns and call attention to their plight. 10
Responding to the needs of children within foster care programs, child
activists are demanding that states acknowledge the fact that some of their
foster care systems are failing. Recently, these child activists have employed
a new tactical maneuver to press their position: Litigation under section

1983 and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Initial
judicial approval of these claims came in April 1991 when the District Court

for the District of Columbia decided LaShawn A. v. Dixon." In LaShawn,
Judge Hogan held that District of Columbia officials had deprived children

in the District's foster care of their constitutionally protected liberty interests
in personal safety and freedom from harm.

2

The District of Columbia

subsequently appealed this ruling on September 25, 1991.13
meting out our theories of justice, i.e. the legislature, the judiciary, etc. Unfortunately, children
have neither the status nor the stature to organize themselves into a politically operative force.
Their voices are not heard on issues that pertain directly to them. Only through advocates
who prominently and prolificly champion the rights of America's children will children
transform into a political power commanding recognition in the political realm.
8. See infra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing District of Columbia's failure
to comply with Judge Ricardo Urbina's numerous orders in children's rights suit).
9. Paul Taylor, Nonprofits Boost Advocacy In the Interest of Children, WAsH. POST,
Jan. 13, 1992, at Al (stating that budget squeeze in states has not only slowed implementation
of new children's programs, but has led to deepest round of cuts in Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, the basic income support program for poor families); Paul Taylor, Saving
our Children-By Cutting Our Taxes, WAsH. PosT, June 9, 1991, at DI (quoting Congressman
J. Dodd (D-Conn.) who stated that federal spending on children's programs grew at only onequarter rate of overall federal budget); Richard Tapscott, Maryland's Doomsday Option,
WAsH. PosT, Jan. 30, 1992, at Al (stating that without increase in taxes, Maryland will trim
$9,000,000 from children-at-risk program and over $7,000,000 from students with disabilities
program).
10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing inability of children to secure
political rights for themselves). See, e.g., Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (challenging racial and religious discrimination in placement of children into publicly
funded, voluntary child-care agencies), aff'd, 848 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988); Joseph A. v. New
Mexico Dep't of Human Serv., 575 F. Supp. 346 (D.N.M. 1982) (focusing on state's failure
to provide adoptive homes to children who could not return to their biological families); G.L.
v. Zumwalt, 564 F. Supp. 1030 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (highlighting serious problems in recruiting,
training, and supervision of foster parents and equally serious problems in training and
supervision of workers). These cases, brought by the ACLU's Children's Rights Project, are
illustrative of the types of suits which child activists press on behalf of children. See generally
Marcia Lowry, Derring-Do in the 1980's: Child Welfare Impact Litigation After the Warren
Years, 20 FA. L.Q. 255 (1986) (discussing early child welfare litigation); see also RobynMarie Lyon, Comment, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counselfor Minors,
75 CAL. L. R-v. 681 (1987) (proposing extending professional responsibility tenets to provide
guidance to attorneys who represent minors).
11. 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991).
12. LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 996 (D.D.C. 1991).
13. Tracy Thompson, Foster Care Ruling Appealed, WAsH. POST, Oct. 1, 1991, at B2.
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Judge Hogan's ruling that children have a constitutional right to adequate foster care is the culminatibn of recent judicial enforcement of
legislative attempts to implement adequate child protection measures in the
District's foster care program. 4 Judge Hogan's ruling is an innovative
approach in the virtually uncharted territory of children's rights. 15 Court
systems historically have treated children as political non-entities, considering
them to be wards of the state or chattel of families.' 6 In the last half of
the twentieth century, however, the Supreme Court has held that the
Constitution requires recognition of particular rights of children, especially
in the juvenile justice and educational arenas. 17 Nevertheless, the Supreme

14. LaShawn, 762 F. Supp. at 996. See District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 571 A.2d 178,
192 (D.C. 1990) (holding District of Columbia in contempt for ignoring consent decree issued
by trial court in children's rights litigation).
15. LaShawn, 762 F. Supp. at 996. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (holding that
juveniles are entitled to same due process procedures granted to adults in criminal proceedings).
Gault is a famous children's rights case in which the Supreme Court declared that the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights applied to children as well as to adults. Id. The Gault
Court stated that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone." Id.: see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969) (holding that children are persons under Constitution). As a result of Gault and Tinker,
the Court afforded children their initial political status under the law. See supra note 7 and
accompanying text (discussing children's political status under law). Children, however, have
not been explicitly granted many of the constitutional protections that apply to adults. See
infra note 16 (discussing how few rights children actually have under Constitution).
16. See Rodham, supra note 7, at 489 (discussing how eighteenth century commentator
William Blackstone wrote little about children's rights and instead stressed duties owed by
"prized possessions" to their fathers). While children have long held rights as parties injured
by tortfeasors, legatees under wills, or intestate successors, adult representatives must exercise
these rights on behalf of the children. Id. However, older children do possess several statutory
rights, such as the right to drive a motor vehicle, the right to drop out of school, the right
to work, the right to vote, and the right to marry. Id. But see Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d
131, 141 (3d Cir. 1989) (ordering district court to appoint person to prosecute retarded child's
claims). In Gardner, the district court removed the grandmother of a severely mentally retarded
teenager as the teenager's next friend, refused to appoint a replacement, and dismissed the
teenager's claims. Id. at 136. The Third Circuit determined that the district court had abused
its discretion by failing to appoint a new next friend and by dismissing the teenager's claims.
Id. at 141. This is one example of how a handicapped child, unable to prosecute her own
claims, becomes the subject of seemingly endless litigation that prevents her from receiving,
on a continuous basis, the special familial, educational, and medical services that she requires.
17. See Rodham, supra note 7, at 489-490 (discussing recent trends of Supreme Court
in children's rights arena); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (arguing
that compulsory school law violated Amish children's religious freedom) (Douglas, J., dissenting); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (concluding that case against child in juvenile
court must be proven beyond reasonable doubt); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding that three teenagers had right to don black arm
band to protest Vietnam war); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967) (holding that adult procedural
protections in criminal trial extend to delinquency proceedings); Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541, 543 (1966) (holding that waiver from juvenile court has to meet minimum requirements of due process); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) (holding that protection of
Fourteenth Amendment against coerced confession extended to fifteen year old boy in state
criminal trial); West. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (granting right
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Court has refused to extend to children all rights constitutionally assured
to adults. 8
The status of children as political beings under the law is beginning to
emerge from its embryonic form.' 9 The courts tend to see the family as a
private unit and generally find it inappropriate to subject a family to
political analysis or moral scrutiny. 20 Though the autonomy granted to an
individual family unit manifests itself in a variety of circumstances, 2' the
ever-increasing atrocities that face children trapped within traditional family
settings have opened the family unit to the public eye." Because children
are powerless to assert their own interests or to organize themselves into a

to refuse to salute flag in public schools when doing so would violate religious beliefs). But
see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-39 (1973) (rejecting claim that
there is fundamental personal right to education under the Constitution). In Rodriquez the
Supreme Court cited Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as stating the Court's
unanimous holding that education was perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. The Rodriguez Court refused to extend this holding
into the constitutional realm, however, holding that education is not afforded either explicit
or implicit protection under the Constitution. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. at 35.
18. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (holding that jury trial is
not constitutionally required in juvenile court's adjudicative stage); see also Organization of
Foster Families for Equality & Reform v. Dumpson 418 F. Supp. 277, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(holding that before foster child can be peremptorily transferred from foster home in which
he has been living, he is entitled to hearing in which all concerned parties may present any
relevant information to administrative decision maker charged with determining future placement of child), rev'd, 431 U.S. 816, 856 (1977) (reversing lower court on grounds that already
existing procedures were adequate). See generally, John F. Gillespie, Annotation, Status and
Rights of Foster Children and Foster Parents under Federal Constitution, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1116
(1978) (analyzing federal court cases discussing status and rights of foster parents and foster
children under federal constitution).
19. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing rights Supreme Court has
granted to children).
20. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (stating that fundamental liberty
interest of natural parents in care, custody, and management of child does not evaporate
simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of child to
state). The Santosky Court stated that "even when blood relationships are strained, [natural]
parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life."
Id.
21. See id. at 768-69 (stating that due process requires that courts find "permanent
neglect" by clear and convincing evidence before terminating parental rights); Prisco v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 851 F.2d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that non-custodial parent has
right to notice and hearing when state places child in Witness Protection Program), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1089 (1989); Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 702 F.2d 710, 715 (8th Cir. 1983) (same);
Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same); Winston v. Children &
Youth Serv., 748 F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (stating that parent's liberty interest in
relationship with child continues even when courts grant temporary custody to state or to
another parent), affd, 948 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1991); Williams v. Carros, 576 F. Supp. 545,
547 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (stating in dicta that regular and appropriate visits between mother and
her children are fundamental liberty interests -protected by Constitution).
22. See Franklin E. Zimring, Legal Perspectives on Family Violence, 75 CAL. L. REv.
521, 525 (1987) (stating that when focus in family setting shifts from child neglect to child
abuse, value accorded family privacy considerations seems to diminish).
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self-interested constituency, 23 children are dependent upon particular institutions to recognize the need for the establishment of children's rights and
24
to assume responsibility for enforcing these rights.
Until recently, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to define or
formalize the status of children's needs and interests.Y Likewise, lower
courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead, preferring to define what
is not a child's constitutional right rather than what is a child's constitutional

right.2 Traditionally, courts have preferred to carve out an area between
parental dominion and state prerogative allowing certain adult rights to
extend to children under specific circumstances.2 7 As the suffering of the

nation's children has increased 2 however, so has the activism within leg-

islatures and courts. 29 All three branches of government are beginning to

23. See Rodham, supra note 7, at 492 (discussing powerlessness of children).
24. See supra note 7 (discussing children's need for powerful advocates); see also supra
note 10 and accompanying text (listing examples of lawsuits that ACLU brings on behalf of
abused children).
25. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing children's limited rights under
Constitution); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d. Cir. 1991) (upholding
Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act of 1989), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 931 (1992). The
dissension that currently exists in determining whether required parental consent to a minor's
abortion is unconstitutional is illustrative of the tension that exists between state and parental
control over a minor's life and the right of a minor to exercise control over her own body.
See id.
26. See Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that foster
children do not have substantive due process right to adoptive homes and that right to
adequate, safe, and sanitary housing is not constitutionally protected right); McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (holding that jury trial is not constitutionally required
in juvenile court's adjudicative stage).
27. See Rodham, supra note 7 at 494-495 (discussing extension of adult rights to children);
see also supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases granting limited
rights to children).
28. See generally NAnONAL CommssoN ON CIuREN, BEYOND RaTOsuc: A NEw
A~mmcA. AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAmES, Final Report of the National Commission
on Children (1991) (assessing status of children and families in United States and proposing
new directions for policy and program development); see also Tracy Thompson, Children Get
Dingy First View of D.C. Caring, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1991, at El (stating that administrative
chaos is major hinderance to court ordered foster care improvements); Finding a Place for
Children, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1991, at A22 (addressing problems inherent to delivery of
social services); Alison Howard, Judge Faults D.C. Youth Detention, WASH. POST, Aug. 22,
1991, at B1 (reporting on District's contempt citation for defying five year old court order to
provide neighborhood shelters and foster care for young defendants).
29. See Social Security Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 420-427, 470-476 (1988) (outlining child welfare
services); 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-627, 670-676 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989) (same); see also Artist M. v.
Johnson 917 F.2d 980, 982 (7th Cir.) (affirming decision to enter preliminary injunction
requiring assignment of case worker to wards of juvenile court within three days), rev'd sub
nom. Suter v. Artist M., 112 U.S. 1360 (1992). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's
decision see infra note 117. See also L.J. v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 122 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that present or former foster children in custody of city department of social services
were entitled to preliminary injunction to redress deficiencies in administration of foster
children program), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989); Lynch v. King, 550 F. Supp. 325, 34042 (D. Mass. 1982) (holding that preliminary injunction would be issued requiring Massachusetts
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realize that platitudes do not feed hungry children, do not eradicate abuse,
do not provide shelter for the homeless, and do not provide rudimentary
health care and educational benefits.30 Judge Hogan refused to succumb to
these platitudes in the LaShawn decision. 3'
The foster care program in the District of Columbia is representative
of the plight that many American children face today. 2 LaShawn is an
excellent example of the judicial involvement that is necessary to eradicate
the abuse that is inherent in many of our nation's foster care programs.
An analysis of LaShawn as a natural extension of the Supreme Court's
decision in Deshaney v. Winnebago County Social Services Department3
will reveal that Judge Hogan correctly decided LaShawn and that the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia should uphold the
case on appeal. A comparison of LaShawn to similar cases in other
jurisdictions, as well as an examination of the sociological and economic
realities in the District of Columbia, will substantiate the necessity for
LaShawn's affirmation. Additionally, an examination of the consent decree
initially accepted by both parties in LaShawn will explore the enforcement
issues that underlie the effectiveness of such orders in foster care litigation.
This examination will reveal that judicial involvement in the execution of
state foster care programs is necessary to insure that states adequately
provide for the children in their care.
LASHiAwN: CARRYING DESHANEY TO ITS LooicAL EXTENSION

In Deshaney v. Winnebago County Social Services Department 4 the
Supreme Court paved the way for lower courts to expand the constitutional
rights of children. The facts of Deshaney are undeniably tragic. The plaintiff,
Joshua Deshaney, was born in 1979.35 His parents divorced in 1980, and
36
the court awarded custody of Joshua to his father, Randy Deshaney.
Joshua's father severely beat Joshua on several occasions. 37 Although the
Department of Social Services to provide each foster child with case plan and to provide
periodic review of each child's case), aff'd sub nom Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir.
1983).
30. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing failure of foster care system).
31. See LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 961 (D.D.C. 1991) (stating that evidence
in case compelled court to find District liable even though court was uncomfortable entertaining
challenge to local government action).
32. See generally Bright Futures, supra note 2 (outlining what new administration can
do to push District from bottom to top of national performance on key child indicators).

33. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
34. Deshaney v. Winnebago County Soc. Serv. Dep't, 489
35. Id. at 191.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 191-93. In Deshaney, the beatings that Joshua's
were sometimes so severe that hospital treatment was necessary.
beating that instigated the Deshaney litigation, emergency room

U.S. 189 (1989).

father inflicted upon his son
Id. Three times prior to the
personnel notified DSS that

in their opinion Joshua was a victim of child abuse. Id. The DSS took certain remedial
precautions, but in all instances concluded that there was no basis for action. Id. Joshua is
now expected to spend the rest of his life in an institution for the profoundly retarded. Id.
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Winnebago County Department of Social Services (DSS) received complaints
that Joshua's father was abusing the child and took various steps to protect
Joshua, the DSS did not remove Joshua from his father's custody."
Eventually, Joshua's father beat his son so severely that Joshua suffered
permanent brain damage and acute retardation.3 9
Joshua and his mother sued the DSS under the United States Civil
Rights Act of 1988. 40 In the suit, Joshua and his mother alleged that the
DSS, in violation of Joshua's rights under the substantive component of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, had deprived Joshua of

his liberty interest in bodily integrity by failing to intervene to protect him
from his father's violence. 4' The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment for the DSS, holding that
the failure of a state agency to render protective services to persons within
its jurisdiction does not violate the Due Process Clause. 42 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision, 43 holding that although the state had deprived Joshua of liberty
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, the state did not share
responsibility for that deprivation because a state employee was not responsible for the deprivation of Joshua's liberty interest in bodily integrity."

38. Id. at 191-93.
39. Id. at 193.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
41. Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
42. Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep 't of Soc. Serv., 812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding that although state denied child liberty within meaning of due process clause,
state did not share responsibility for that deprivation). The plaintiff's complaint contained a
pendent party claim against Randy DeShaney, but the district court relinquished jurisdiction
of the pendent claim when it dismissed the federal claim on DSS's motion for summary
judgment. Id.
43. Deshaney, 812 F.2d at 304.
44. Id. at 301-04 (7th Cir. 1987). The Seventh Circuit adheres to the theory that a state's
failure to protect people for private violence not attributable to the conduct of its employees
is not a deprivation of constitutionally protected property or liberty. Id. at 301; see Walker
v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 510 (7th Cir.) (holding that Due Process Clause does not ensure safe
working conditions for state employees), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986); Ellsworth v. Racine,
774 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that nothing in constitution requires governmental
units to act when members of general public are in danger), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986);
Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443, 1446 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that city could not be held
liable for deaths of children and property damage in fire which occurred during strike by
municipal fire fighters because fire fighters had no constitutional duty to act and did not
effect deprivation within meaning of Fourteenth Amendment when they carried out strike
threat); Beard v. O'Neal, 728 F.2d 894, 898-900 (7th Cir.) (holding that FBI informant who
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The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. 45 First, the

Court held that the state's failure to protect an individual against private
violence generally does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause
because it imposes no duty on the state to provide members of the general

public with adequate protection services. 46 Second, the Court rejected the
contention that the state's knowledge of Joshua's danger and expressions
of willingness to help protect him against that danger established a "special
relationship" that gave rise to an affirmative duty to protect. 47 The plaintiff
found support for the "special relationship" theory in several United States
Court of Appeals cases that held that once the state learns that a third

party poses a special danger to an identified victim, and then demonstrates
its willingness to protect the victim against that danger, a "special relation-

accompanied murder victim on night of murder did not have constitutional duty to prevent
murder), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 825 (1984); Jackson v. Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (7th
Cir. 1983) (holding that attempt by state officers to assist at accident is not deprivation of
life without due process of law when attempt fails because of negligence or even gross
negligence of offices and accident victim dies), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984); Bowers v.
DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding state does not violate Due Process Clause
by failing to protect citizens against being rfurdered by criminals or madpersons, absent any
discrimination in providing protection against crimes of violence). The First and Eleventh
Circuits, as well as the District of Columbia, have adopted the Seventh Circuit's view. See
Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 722 (1st Cir.) (holding that fact that state
psychiatrists knew or should have known inmate legally in state custody while on furlough
was of special danger to victim, as distinct from public at large, did not create special
relationship of constitutional dimension between state and victim such that failure to protect
victim implicated Due Process Clause), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); Bradberry v. Pinella
County, 789 F.2d 1513, 1516 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that county had no constitutional'
obligation to provide lifeguards, and thus could not be held liable for gross negligence on
grounds that swimmer drowned because of lack of such services); Washington v. District of
Columbia, 802 F.2d 1478, 1481-82 (D.C.Cir. 1986) (holding that reckless failure of state
officials to remedy unsafe prison condition did not deprive prison guard of Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest). But see Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 51011 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that once state is aware of danger that particular child may be
abused, special relationship arises between it and child and places on state constitutional duty
to protect child from abuse). The Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected the Third Circuit's holding.
See Deshaney, 812 F.2d at 303. The Seventh Circuit, however, has held that the Constitution
protects defenseless children whom the state places in danger. See White v. Rochford, 592
F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that to leave helpless minor children subject to inclement
weather and great physical harm is clear intrusion upon personal integrity).
45. Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 194.
46. Id. at 194-197.
47. Id. at 198. Prior to Deshaney, the Supreme Court had found that the state could
create or assume certain "special relationships" that would give rise to an affirmative duty,
enforceable through the Due Process clause, to provide adequate protection. See Youngberg
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-325 (1982) (holding that when state voluntarily commits mentally
retarded individual to state institution, individual has constitutionally protected liberty interest
under Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment to reasonably safe conditions of confinement and freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104-105 (1976) (holding that deliberate indifference by prison personnel to prisoner's serious
illness or injury constituted cruel and unusual punishment contravening Eighth Amendment).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:529

ship" arises between the state and the victim, causing the Due Process
Clause to impose an affirmative duty on the state to render adequate
protection. 48 Refusing to acknowledge that a "special relationship" existed
between Joshua and the state, the Court found that while the state may
have been aware of Joshua's plight, the state had played no part in the
creation of the abuse, and therefore, the Due Process Clause did not impose
upon the state an affirmative duty to provide Joshua with adequate protec49
tion.
The Court, however, did infer that when the state initiates or assumes
a custodial relationship over a child, a constitutional duty to assume
responsibility for the child's safety and well-being arises.50 The Court
compared the custodial relationship that the state assumes over a child
placed in foster care5 to the relationship that the state has with incarcerated
or institutionalized men and women.1 2 The Court rationalized that when the
state affirmatively exercises its power and restrains an individual's liberty
so that it renders him unable to care for himself, and then subsequently
fails to provide for the individual's basic human needs, the state's failure
to provide even rudimentary care for these restrained individuals violates
the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the
53
Due Process Clause.

48. Deshaney v Winnebago County Soc. Serv. Dep't, 489 U.S. 189, 198 n.4 (1988).
49. Id. at 198.
50. Id. at 201 n.9. The Deshaney Court stated that
... Had the State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed Joshua from
free society and placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, we might have
a situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise
to an affirmative duty to protect.
Id.
51. Id. at 198-99.
52. See id. (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) which required state to
provide adequate medical care to incarcerated prisoners); Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.,
463 U.S. 239, 244-46 (1983) (holding that Due Process Clause requires responsible government
or governmental agency to provide medical care to suspects in police custody who have been
injured while being apprehended by police); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982)
(holding that Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment requires state to provide involuntarily committed mental patients with such services necessary to ensure their "reasonable
safety" from themselves and others).
53. Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200. The Deshaney Court stated that:
[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his
will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being. . The rational for this principle is
simple enough: when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains
an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the
same time fails to provide for his basic human needs-e.g., food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, and reasonable safety-it transgresses the substantive limits on state
action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause ... The affirmative
duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament
or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has
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Judge Hogan presided over the LaShawn litigation slightly more than
two years after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Deshaney.
LaShawn arose from the inefficiency with which the District of Columbia
runs its foster care and adoption programs. 54 Taken from their natural
homes through affirmative state action, many children under the District's
foster care, are victims of abuse within their foster homes, as well as being
victims of the bureaucratic foster care system. 5 The American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) brought the LaShawn class action on behalf of thousands
of District of Columbia children and alleged both statutory and constitutional violations in the administration of the District's foster care system.5 6
The ACLU's allegations included the failure of the District of Columbia
Department of Human Services (DHS) to initiate timely investigations into
reports of abuse and neglect, the failure to place in appropriate foster
homes and institutions those who may not safely remain at home, the
failure to develop case plans and monitor children in the state's foster care,
and the failure to place children in a permanent home, whether by returning
them to their natural homes or by freeing them for adoption.5 7
Due to budgetary constraints, excessive caseloads, staff shortages, an
inept foster care program, and the indifference of the District of Columbia's
administration, many children under the care of the DHS live in a perpetual
state of limbo, have no home truly to call their own, and often suffer abuse
within the homes in which the DHS places them. 5 These children must rely
on the DHS to protect them from physical, mental, and emotional abuse,
and also to provide them with a permanent home.5 9 The egregious facts of
LaShawn,6° as well as reports published in numerous newspaper articles and

imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.
Id. See Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case For ConstitutionalProtection'ofFoster
Children From Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 199, 201 (1988) (arguing that
foster children have equal, if not greater, claim to federal judicial protection from harm while
in state care than do institutionalized persons who are already accorded significant protection).
54. LaShawn v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 960 (D.D.C. 1991).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 961. The ACLU alleged that the District violated the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-27, 670-79 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989), and the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-06. The ACLU alleged further that
the District violated several of their own municiple statutes. The District statutes in controversy
are the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, D.C. LAw 2-22 (1977) (codified
as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1351-57 (1988) and D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2101-07, §§
6-2121-27, and §§ 16-2351-65 (1989), and the Youth Residential Facilities Licensure Act of
1986, D.C. LAW 6-139 (1986) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 3-801-08 (1988).
Id.
57. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 420-427, 470-476 (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 620627, 670-676 (1988 & Supp. I 1989) (providing procedures to insure that children receive
adequate foster care).
58. LaShawn, 762 F. Supp. at 960.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 983-87 (outlining harm to named plaintiffs in LaShawn). Four child
psychiatrists testified on behalf of four named plaintiffs in the LaShawn litigation. Id. at 983.
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child activist studies, prove that the DHS consistently has failed to meet
6
the needs of many of the District's children. '
In LaShawn, Judge Hogan unequivocally found for the plaintiffs,
asserting that section 1983 provides a federal remedy for violations 'of the
federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA). 62
Judge Hogan determined that the DHS, by virtue of official policy or
custom, deprived foster care children of rights conferred to them by the
AACWA. 63 He also held that District officials deprived children in the
District's foster care of their constitutionally protected liberty interests in
violation of section 1983. 64 Judge Hogan concluded that the DHS had
exhibited the level of affirmative state intervention and control that the
Deshaney Court had indicated was necessary to find that a state had deprived
an individual of his liberty interest in bodily integrity. This determination
The psychiatrist who examined LaShawn A. found that LaShawn suffered from "Attention
Deficit Hypersensitivity Disorder" (AD-AH), was severely emotionally delayed, and was
overwhelmed by stimuli. Id. While the psychiatrist admitted that LaShawn A. had psychological
problems before entering foster care, he concluded that the mishandling of her case while she
was in the District's custody contributed to her disorders. Id. The District mishandled LaShawn
A.'s case in a myriad of ways. LaShawn A.'s mother voluntarily placed LaShawn A. in the
District's custody when LaShawn A. was two-and-a-half years old. The District did not attempt
to enable LaShawn A. to stay at home. Id. The District placed LaShawn A. with a woman
who had no intention of adopting the child. Id. A psychiatric evaluation indicated that the
child's foster mother may have physically abused the child, as well as exposed the child to
sexual abuse in the foster home. Id. Throughout the trial, despite these allegations, LaShawn
A. remained in her foster home. Id.
The other named plaintiff's stories are similar to LaShawn A.'s story. The District shuffles
many children around from one foster home to another, and sometimes transfers the children
between institutions and foster homes. The children are given no sense of permanency, no
chance to be adopted, and they are often abused in the environments in which they find
themselves. Id. at 983-86. As a result of these findings, Judge Hogan found that the District
has irreparably harmed the children in its foster care. Id. at 986.
61. Id. at 982-983.
62. Id. at 989. Judge Hogan looked to the First, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits in determining
that the federal statutes relied upon by plaintiffs create actionable rights under section 1983.
See L.J. v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 122-24 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding provisions of Social
Security Act gave foster children right to protections enforceable under § 1983), cert denied,
488 U.S. 1018 (1989); Lesher v. Lavrich, 784 F.2d 193, 197-98 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding plaintiffs
not entitled to damages for alleged violations of Adoption Assistance Act but agreeing with
Lynch that it may be reasonable to allow parents and children affected by programs it funds
to sue to force those programs to comply with federal funding requirements); Lynch v.
Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 509-12 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that federal Adoption Assistance Act
confers enforceable rights upon children in custody of states receiving federal funding under
Act). But see Del A. v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 (E.D. La. 1991) (holding that
provisions of Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act requiring case plan and case review
system were so vague and amorphous as to evade judicial enforcement under section 1983).
The Del A. court also held that the provision of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act requiring placement in foster homes and institutions that are reasonable in accord with
national standards was so vague as to be incapable of judicial enforcement under section 1983.
Id. at 1310. The Del A. court also held that the language of the statute did not imply a
private right of enforcement. Id. at 1310-11.
63. LaShawn, 762 F. Supp. at 989.
64. Id. at 998.
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had
enabled Judge Hogan to find that the District's egregious behavior
65
resulted in the violation of the children's constitutional rights.
Children's rights activists hail as a landmark decision Judge Hogan's
holding that the District deprived foster children of their constitutionally
protected liberty interests. 6 One of the reasons for such praise from child
activists is that Judge Hogan was not reluctant to tackle the constitutional
issues raised in LaShawn.67 By determining that children do have a constitutional right to adequate foster care when embraced by a state welfare
6
program, Judge Hogan considerably expanded the rights of children. 1
In Deshaney, the Supreme Court found that the DSS did not assume a
custodial relationship over Joshua even though the DSS removed him from
his father's care.6 9 The Court found that although the state had once
assumed temporary custody over Joshua, the DSS had not created the
custodial relationship that triggers a constitutionally protected liberty interest
because the DSS ultimately placed Joshua back with his father.7 0 In the
Court's view, no state liability existed because the state placed Joshua in
no worse and in no better a situation; instead the state placed Joshua back
in the same abusive environment from which the DSS had originally removed
him.

65. Id. at 992. But see Del A. 777 F. Supp. at 1318 (finding no violation of children's
constitutional rights under Federal Adoption Assistance Act). Plaintiffs in Del A. alleged the
existence and violation of several substantive constitutional rights. Id. at 318-320. Plaintiffs
asserted that they had a right to reasonable physical safety, emotional and psychological safety,
and placement in a less restrictive setting. Id. at 318-20. The Del A. court found that there is
no clearly established right to a stable foster home environment. Id. See also Drummond v.
Fulton County Dep't, 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977) (rejecting right to stable foster home
environment), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978). The Del A. court also stated that there is
not a liberty interest in the emotional well-being of the children. Del. A., 777 F. Supp. at
1319. See also Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1439 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating no liberty
interest in individual's emotional well-being exists), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 712 (1991). The
Del A. court also found that children in state custody do not have a right to be placed in the
least restrictive foster care arrangement. Del A., 777 F. Supp. at 1320.
66. Proposed Final Order, LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991) (No.
89-1754).
67. BIGrr FuTruRs, supra note 2, at 109. Child activists are pleased with LaShawn
because Judge Hogan's opinion and decree provided an opportunity for District officials to
begin to address the problems that have plagued the District's child welfare system for years.
Id.; see also Tracie Reddick, ACLU, City Sign Pact to Upgrade Care,, WAsH. TIMEs, Aug.
27, 1991, at BI (quoting ACLU attorney as stating "we are confident that this [joint agreement]
can become an important blueprint for changing the city's child care system and making it
into a model for the nation").
68. Children's Rights: 1991 Biennial, ACLU UPDATE (Children's Rights Project, New
York, N.Y.) 1991. The ACLU hails LaShawn as the first class-action in the United States to
result in a litigated judgement in which a court has declared that a state operated an entire
foster-care system illegally. Id. at 3.
69. Deshaney v. Winnebago County Soc. Serv. Dep't, 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989). Writing
for the Deshaney majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed the view that "the State does
not become the permanent guarantor of an individual's safety by having once offered him
shelter." Id.
70. Id. at 201.
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In contrast, the District of Columbia DHS had removed the children

71
in LaShawn from their natural families and placed them in foster homes.

Foster parents are agents of the DHS because the state empowers them to

provide substitute family care for children when a child's natural parents
are unable to do so properly. 72 The LaShawn plaintiffs, therefore, were in
the custodial arms of the state when the abuse occurred. 73 Thus, the facts
of LaShawn met the Supreme Court's requirements for the special custodial
relationship that the dicta in Deshaney indicated was necessary for establishing state liability under the Fourteenth Amendment. 74 This qualified
custodial relationship gave Judge Hogan the opportunity to carry Deshaney

to its natural extension: When a state assumes a custodial relationship over
children by embracing them within the state's welfare programs, the
children
75
have a liberty interest in safe conditions while in state custody.
Flores v. Meese: THE NINTH CIRCUIT FAILS TO FOLLOW JUDGE HOGAN'S
LEAD

On August 9, 1991, three months after the LaShawn decision, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Flores v.
Meese.76 Citing Deshaney and LaShawn in its analysis, the Flores opinion
additionally addresses the liability that federal agencies face when placing
children in a state-initiated custodial relationship. 77 Unfortunately, instead
of following Judge Hogan's lead and encouraging judicial involvement in
the child welfare arena, the Flores court preferred to encourage a laissez
faire approach to agency intervention in the child care realm.

71. LaShawn v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 962 (D.D.C. 1991).
72. See Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200 (stating that had state removed Joshua from free
society and placed him in foster home operated by state agents that there might have been
affirmative duty to protect). Deshaney indicates that the Supreme Court views foster families
as agents of the state. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has decided
that Deshaney stands for just such a proposition. In K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914
F.2d 846, 860 n.6 (7th Cir. 1990), Judge Posner stated that "those persons to whom the state
contracts its responsibilities for the supervision of the placement and care of foster children
act as agents of the state." But see Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 901 F.2d 387, 392 (4th Cir.
1990) (interpreting Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep't Soc. Serv., 871 F.2d 474 (4th
Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989)) (holding that harm suffered by child at hands of foster
parents is not harm inflicted by state agents). Milburn emphasized the state's lack of responsibility for a child's voluntary placement by the natural parents in an abusing private foster
home. Milburn, 871 F.2d at 476.
See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 823
(1977) (citing Child Welfare League of America's definition of foster care). The Smith Court
stated that foster care is defined as a child welfare service which provides substitute family
care for child when his or her own family cannot care for him or her for temporary or
extended periods of time, and when adoption is neither desirable nor possible. Id. at 823.
73. LaShawn, 762 F. Supp. at 960.
74. Id. at 959.
75. Id. at 992.
76. 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991).
77. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1363-64 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub nom.
Barr v. Flores, 112 S. Ct. 1261 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1992) (No. 91-905).
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In Flores, the National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., brought a
class action on behalf of children whom state authorities had arrested on
suspicion of being illegal aliens, but whom the state had not yet determined
to be deportable. 78 The suit challenged an Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) policy that required governmental detention of children during
the pendency of deportation proceedings. 79 The INS required detention of
the children unless an adult relative or legal guardian was available to
assume custody, even if another responsible adult was willing and able to
care for the child and to ensure the child's attendance at a deportation
hearing. s0 In Flores, the INS admitted that the regulation was not necessary
to ensure the children's attendance at deportation hearings, and did not
contend that the release of the detained children would create a threat of
harm to the children or to anyone else."
The United States District Court for the Central District of California
held that a blanket detention policy was unlawful.8 2 The court entered an
order compelling the state, where feasible, to release to a responsible third
party those children whom the state would have released had a parent or
other relative come forward.8 3 The INS appealed, and a divided panel of
the United States Cour. of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's holding that the detention policy was unlawful. 4 The majority of
the panel held that the INS detention policy did not involve any of the
children's fundamental rights, and that deference to the INS's implementation of congressional immigration policy mandated judicial approval of
the INS policy restricting the release of the children.8" On rehearing, en
banc, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed the divided panel and affirmed
the district court's order.86 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari on March 2, 1992.87
The INS contended that the plaintiffs' status as aliens and as children
limited their liberty interests.8 8 The Ninth Circuit did not agree with the
INS, stating that aliens have a fundamental right to freedom from govern-

78. Id. at 1354.
79. Id. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.24 (1988) (codifying INS policy that requires governmental

detention of children during pendency of deportation proceedings).
80. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1354; see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (holding that
because aliens are persons present in United States they must be afforded procedural protection
in conjunction with any deprivation of liberty). The Flores court extended the Mathews rational
that presence within the United States triggers due process procedural protections to children
suspected of alien status. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1354.
81. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1354.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.

85. Id.at 1358.
86. Id. at 1354.
87. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub. noma.
Flores, 112 S. Ct. 1261 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1992) (No. 91-905).
88. Id. at 1358.

Barr v.
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mental detention unless there is a judicial determination that confinement
is necessary. s9 The INS then asserted that detention would better serve the
children's interests than would release to an adult whose living environment
the INS did not have the means to investigate. 90 A principle concern of the
INS, however, dealt not with the detained children's interests, but with the
INS's interest in avoiding liability. 9' The INS attempted to justify its
detention policy by asserting that the policy was necessary to protect the
agency from potential liability in the event any harm befell the children
after such a release. 92 The INS's fear of imposition of liability undoubtedly
stemmed from the Deshaney and LaShawn decisions highlighting agency
liability in the face of inept administration and allegations of abuse within
child welfare programs.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the INS's arguments, stating that because
child welfare was not a field of INS expertise, the INS was incapable of
determining that detention served the best interests of the plaintiff children. 9
The court found that it was highly unlikely that the INS would be subject
to liability for releasing a minor to a responsible unrelated adult without a
"home study." 94 In reaching this decision, the court cited Deshaney as
expressing the Supreme Court's view that under section 1983 a state welfare
department, an agency with far more expertise in child welfare-than the
INS, is not liable for allowing a child to remain in the custody of an adult
despite clear evidence that such custody placed the child in danger. 95

89. Id. at 1360. See R. HoRowrrz & H. DAVIDSON, LEoAL RiGHTs OF CHILDREN § 10.10,
at 431 (1984) (stating that child's "right to be treated in the manner least restrictive to the

child's liberty ... has its roots in the well-settled concept that, while constitutional rights may
be restricted by the state for legitimate purposes, the restriction must be no greater than
necessary to achieve these purposes").
90. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1362.

91. Id.
92. Id.at 1363.
93. Id.at 1362-1363. The Flores court relied on Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88, 114-15 (1976), which states that a court should not defer to an agency determination in
any area outside of agency's expertise. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1362-1363. The court also found

that the policy was contrary to the congressional determination that institutional detention of
juveniles is disfavored. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 5035, 5039 (1988) (stating that juveniles should be
detained in foster home or community facility whenever possible); see also In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 31-52 (1967) (holding that adult procedural protections in criminal trial extend to
delinquency proceedings); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (stating that
government's regulatory interest in community safety can in appropriate circumstances outweigh
individual's liberty interest); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264-274 (1984) (approving postarrest detention of juveniles when they present continuing danger to community); Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 541-542 (1952) (holding no denial of due process under Fifth Amendment

in detention of alien communists without bail, pending determination of deportability, where
there is reasonable cause to believe release on bail would endanger safety and welfare of
United States).
94. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1363; see also infra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing
and elaborating on agency home studies).
95. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1363.
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The Flores court's reliance on Deshaney in this context, however, is
erroneous. In Deshaney, one of the Supreme Court's rationales for denying
liability on the part of the state was the fact that the DSS placed Joshua
back in the custody of his father, not with an unrelated third party.9 The
Ninth Circuit's failure to address the distinction between placing a child
with an unknown adult and placing a child with his natural parent casts a
large shadow on the court's curt rejection of state liability. Instead of
directly addressing the issue, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the distinction
briefly in a footnote, stating that if the INS acted affirmatively to place a
child in a home from which he had not originally come, the threat of
liability on behalf of the agency would be greater. 97 The Flores court's
acknowledgement of the possibility of state liability for placing a child in
a home from which he had not originally come contradicts its finding that
the INS would most likely not be held liable for releasing children to an
unrelated adult without a home study. The Flores court went on to note
that decisions such as Deshaney illustrate that state agencies face far greater
exposure to liability by maintaining special custodial relationships with
children than by releasing children from the constraints of governmental
care and control.98
While the Ninth Circuit can legitimately make the assertion that states
face greater exposure to liability when maintaining custodial relationships
over individuals than by maintaining less protective relationships over individuals, the Ninth Circuit has ignored the impact that such a statement
will have upon subsequent children's rights litigation. Flores' assertion that
greater liability stems from custodial relationships might encourage state
agencies to avoid such relationships whenever possible. 9 As a result, some
children who are in need of the state's protection will find little, if any,
assistance because of a state's desire to avoid liability. While future courts
might depend on the dicta contained within Flores to excuse LaShawn-type

96. Deshaney v. Winnebago County Soc. Serv. Dep't, 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989).
97. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1363 n.2. Footnote 2 of the Flores opinion states that:
A state would of course face a somewhat greater threat of liability after releasing a
child to the custody of a responsible third party as opposed to the custody of a
parent as in Deshaney. This is because the State would have acted affirmatively to
place the child in a home from which the child had not originally come, as opposed
to returning the child to the same home and assuring placement in "no worse
position than that in which he would have been had [the state] not acted at all."
Id. (citing Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 198).
98. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1363. The Ninth Circuit cites Deshaney, Youngberg,, and LaShawn
in support of its conclusion that state agencies face greater exposure to liability when
maintaining special custodial relationships with children than by releasing them from governmental control. Id.
99. See Jonathan Freedman, Foster Child: A Generation of Neglect, A Legacy of Loss,
L.A. Tb&Es, Apr. 9, 1990, (Metro), at B5 (addressing fact that state orders child care it knows
will not be given to children because state does not have to pay for services it requires). If
California is willing to spend money on administrative measures to insure that it is free from
the burdens of child welfare, it is likely that state agencies will take similar measures.
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abuses of state responsibility, this dicta is far from decisive, because Flores
is easily distinguishable from LaShawn.
First, although the Flores court found that the INS did not have the
expertise to conduct adequate home studies, the court implied that some
agencies do have the capacity to conduct home studies. 1°° Child welfare
agencies have the requisite proficiency to conduct meaningful home studies.
Federal statutes recognize this level of expertise by requiring welfare agencies

to conduct home studies before placing a child in a foster home.' 0' Under
Flores, the judicial system would grant greater weight to state welfare agency
decisions based upon the agency's inherent expertise at evaluating home
situations, than to the INS, which does not have the requisite expertise to

evaluate a foster home situation.'2 This same level of expertise would
undoubtedly be present in determinations made by adoption agencies and
juvenile detention centers. 03 Thus, it would be much easier to prove negligence by a welfare agency for failing to conduct appropriate home studiesparticularly when these studies are mandated by statute or propagated

through internal agency regulations'04-than to find the INS negligent for

100. Flores, 942 F.2d 1352, 1362-63 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub nom. Barr v. Flores,
112 S. Ct. 1261 (1992) (U.S. Mar. 2, 1992) (No. 91-905).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 675 (1988 & Supp. I 1989). The statute states in pertinent part that
(1) The term "case plan" means a written document which includes at least the
following:
(A) A description of the type of home or institution in which a child is to
be placed, including a discussion of the appropriateness of the placement and
how the agency which is responsible for the child plans to carry out the
voluntary placement agreement entered into or judicial determination made
with respect to the child in accordance with section 472(a)(1) [42 U.S.C. §
672(a)(1)].
(B) A plan for assuring that the child receives proper care and that services
are provided to the parents, child, and foster parents in order to improve the
condition in the parent's home, facilitate return of the child to his own home
or the permanent placement of the child, and address the needs of the child
while in foster care, including a discussion of the appropriateness of the
services that have been provided to the child under the plan.

Id.

While the word "home study" does not appear within the statute, the statute provides
for such a procedure by requiring a description of the home in which the state plans to place
the child, and requiring the inclusion of a discussion of the appropriateness of the placement.
These requirements cannot be adequately met without careful observation of the home into
which the state plans to place a child. There are benefits to conducting thorough home studies
before placing a child in a foster home. When such studies are conducted adequately, there is
less of a chance of placing a child in a home injurious to his mental, physical, or emotional
health. If there is to be a trade off due to lack of welfare agency staff or funding, a prudent
preventative measure is a thorough, screening, precautionary home study.
102. See id. § 675(5)(a),(b),(c) (outlining case review procedures).
103. See id. § 670 (outlining case review procedures).
104. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing home studies); see also 45
C.F.R. § 1392.16 (1969) (outlining regulations promulgated by Secretary of Health and Human
Services regarding service plans for children in welfare programs). 45 C.F.R. § 1392.16 in

1992]

RESPONDING TO THE PLEAS OF CHILDREN

similar deficiencies, because the Flores court applies a different standard to
the INS than it does to a welfare agency.
Second, a striking distinction exists between an "unrelated adult without
a home study" and a "responsible third party." A responsible third party,
such as a foster parent, constitutes the precise "special relationship" con05
sidered necessary in Deshaney.1
This special relationship was formed be-

cause the state affirmatively acted to remove a child from his natural family
and placed the child in a foster home operated by state agents. Under
LaShawn, the state owes the children it places in foster homes a statutory

and constitutional duty to ensure that they remain free from harm.? 6
LaShawn and federal statutes do not require that the state place foster
children in ideal environments, but rather that the state place these children
in an environment conducive to the child's safety and general well-being. 07

Any agency that placed a child, without benefit of a home study, with an
unrelated adult from whom the child was not originally taken would be
negligent under Deshaney and LaShawn, and courts could hold these agen-

cies liable for any harm that befalls the child while in these unexamined
homes. Not only do both Deshaney and LaShawn provide for such liability,
but the Flores court also admits the possibility of such liability, 0 8 implicitly
agreeing with Deshaney and LaShawn. Despite this implicit agreement
among the three cases, the language in Flores sends government agencies
the message that a philosophy of laissez-faire toward child care will prevent
multi-million dollar liability. Conversely, federal statutes such as the AACWA
and cases such as LaShawn illustrate that the legislature, child activists, and
the general public will not tolerate acts of brutality and abuse within foster
homes. This public concern hopefully will override state apathy toward
providing adequate foster care.1 9

pertinent part reads as follows:
(a) A service plan must be developed and maintained on a continuous basis for each
family and child who requires service to maintain and strengthen family life, foster
child development and achieve permanent and adequately compensated employment...
(c) Such plans must be developed in cooperation with the family and must be
responsive to the needs of each individual within the family, while taking account
of the relation of individual needs to the functioning of the family as a whole.
Families shall have the right to accept or reject such plans...
(e) Each service plan must be reviewed as often as necessary, but at least annually,
to assure that it is practically related to needs and is being effectively implemented.
Id.
105. Deshaney v. Winnebago County Soc. Serv. Dep't, 489 U.S. 189, 198 (1989).
106. LaShawn v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991).
107. Id. at 992.
108. See supra note 100-101 and accompanying text (discussing flaw in Flores logic).
109. See 125 CONo. REc. 522679 (daily ed. August 3, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Cranston)
(introducing Adoption Assistance, Foster Care, and Child Welfare Amendments of 1979).
Senator Cranston introduced the Adoption Assistance, Foster Care, and Child Welfare Amendments of 1979 to the senate by stating that
the legislation we are introducing today is aimed at strengthening and improving the
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ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS INHERENT TO THE LASnAWN DECISION

Assuming that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia will
affirm LaShawn, the issue to consider becomes whether a constitutional
right to adequate foster care" 0 will encourage enforcement of both the
federal and District welfare statutes. The ACLU hailed the LaShawn enforcement order as an effective measure to ensure appropriate funding and
compliance."' This commendation, however, is weakened by the fact that
the District of Columbia has appealed the decision after working with the
ACLU for nearly three months to come up with a mutually agreeable
order." 2 The District of Columbia Office of Corporate Council based its
appeal on the position that the federal courts should not have any say in
the day-to-day running of city agencies." 3 The District also attempted to
substantiate its appeal by asserting that the LaShawn decision contradicted
the District's position in an amicus curiae brief filed in a case pending
4
before the Supreme Court that is similar to LaShawn."

existing federally-supported foster care system for dependent and neglected children,
establishing an adoption assistance program to encourage the adoption of children
with special needs, and improving the existing federally-supported child welfare
services program.
Id. While one of the main purposes of the act was to attempt to create legislation that would
keep children with their natural families or that would find permanent adoptive families when
necessary, id. at 22680, Senator Cranston's remarks indicate that the American public is
concerned about child welfare.
110. LaShawn, 762 F. Supp. at 996 (D.D.C. 1991). Judge Hogan held that
the plaintiffs in the District's foster care have liberty interests in personal safety and
freedom from harm. The facts of this case establish beyond any doubt that defendants
have failed to protect these plaintiffs from harm-whether physical, psychological,
or emotional-by failing to place plaintiffs appropriately, failing to prepare case
plans, failing to monitor placements, and failing to insure permanent homes, among
other things.
Id.
111. Telephone interview with Christopher Dunn, Staff Counsel for ACLU's Children's
Rights Project in New York, N.Y. (September 3, 1991).
112. Tracy Thompson, Foster Care Ruling Appealed, WASH. PosT, Oct. 1, 1991, at BI.
The District has undermined the ACLU's commendation by the fact that the number of social
workers overseeing children in the District has declined since both parties signed the consent
decree in April. Tracy Thompson, ACLU Says D.C. Losing Caseworkers, WASH. PosT, Jan.
7, 1992, (Metro), at D3. Further indication that compliance with the consent decree is far
from forthcoming is the fact that on February 10, 1992, a undetermined number of District
social workers staged a sickout to protest poor working conditions, frustration, and stress that
they claim inhibit them from protecting children in the city's foster-care system. Christine
Spolar, Foster Care Employees Stage Sickout, WASH. PosT, February 11, 1992, (metro), at
BS.
113. Thompson, Foster Care Ruling Appealed, supra note 115, at Bl.
114. See Artist M. v. Johnson, 917 F.2d 980 (1990) (holding that Federal Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1982 creates legal rights on part of children taken into
government custody), rev'd sub nom. Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992). Artist M.
was an action challenging compliance by the Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services with the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act. Id. at 982. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois entered a preliminary injunction
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The District's arguments do little to bolster its position. The facts in
LaShawn indicate that the District is incapable of competently running its
child welfare services, and a contrary position taken in an amicus curiae
brief does little to relieve the plight of the District children who are receiving
inadequate foster care at the hands of the state. Although the Supreme
Court accepted the District's amicus curiae position," 5 the Court's ruling
does not necessitate reversal of LaShawn." 6 Years of broken promises by
District officials to provide aid to needy children undoubtedly will continue
if the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia Court overturns
7
LaShawn

1 1

The plaintiffs in LaShawn sought only prospective injunctive relief,
claiming that the District of Columbia has violated several federal and state
statutes, as well as the Fifth Amendment through the District's ineptly
managed foster care system."" Judge Hogan fashioned relief in the form of
a comprehensive final order." 9 Judge Hogan did not exceed his authority
requiring assignment of case workers to wards of the juvenile court within three days, and
the state officials appealed. Id. at 984. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held:
(1) the act created rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) there was a private right of
action under the statute; (3) children living at home had standing to sue under the act; and
(4) evidence supported the determination that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on
the merits of their claim. Id. at 980. Consequently, the state officials once again appealed and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Suter v. Artist M. Ill S. Ct. 2008 (1991). On March
25, 1992, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit holding that § 671(a)(15) of the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 does not confer on its beneficiaries a
private right enforceable in a § 1983 action, and that the AACWA does not create an implied
cause of action for private enforcement. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992). The Court's holding
in Artist M. should not affect the LaShawn decision because Judge Hogan found that the
operation of the District's welfare program violated the foster children's constitutional rights
as well as their rights under a provision of the District's local law. See Ruth Marcus, Court
Shuts Out Foster Care Children, WAsH. PosT, Mar. 26, 1992, at A3 (quoting Marcia Lowry,
director of Children's Rights Project of ACLU, principal council for LaShawn plaintiffs).
115. See Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992) (holding that §671(a)(15) of AACWA
does not confer on beneficiaries private right enforceable in § 1983 action); see generally Brief
of the States of Louisiana, Alabama, Arizona, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Petitioner State of Illinois, Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992), (No. 90-1488) (including
District in list of amici curiae).
116. See supra note 117 (stating why Supreme Court's holding in Artist M. does not
necessitate reversal of LaShawn).
117. See District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 571 A.2d 178 (D.C. 1990) (demonstrating how
District repeatedly defies court orders in child welfare cases). The language of Judge Ricardo
Urbina in his tenth order in the Jerry M lawsuit effectively illustrates that the District is
reticent to honor its obligation to care for the foster children under its control. The opening
line of this order states
This memorandum order, the tenth issued since the signing of the consent decree in
this case, arises as a result of defendants' continued noncompliance with the decree
and this Court's attempts to effectuate the decree over the past five years.
Memorandum Order J at I, District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 571 A.2d 178 (D.C.1990) (No.
1519-85).
118. Plaintiff's Pretrial Brief Addressing Issues of Liability and Standards for Appropriate
Relief at 1-2, LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991) (No. 89-1754).
119. Proposed Final Order, LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1990) (No.
89-1754).
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to issue the final decree in the LaShawn litigation because the Supreme
Court has held that courts may find municipalities liable under section 1983
when execution of a government's policy or custom inflicts injury. 120 Section
1983 provides a federal remedy for violations of both federal statutory and
constitutional rights. 121 The standards governing the establishment of liability
for violations of statutory provisions differ from the standards governing
the establishment of liability for violations of constitutional provisions.
Judge Hogan, therefore, addressed each set of standards separately.
The District argues that courts should refrain from entering the admin-

istrative domain of governmental agencies;'2 however, federal statutes provide for state and municipal liability when these public entities disregard
legislative mandates. 23 The AACWA imposes mandatory obligations on
states and municipalities, and states subject to these obligations must comply
fully with the statutory requirements. 124 The degree of noncompliance necessary to establish class-wide liability for violations of the AACWA was an
issue of first impression in the District of Columbia District Court before
LaShawn. 125

The LaShawn plaintiffs argued that injunctive relief is appropriate when
the state commits statutory violations that are as egregious and pervasive
as those violations committed in LaShawn.126 For example, in Lynch v.
King, 127 a class of children in the foster care custody of Massachusetts
sought injunctive relief for alleged violations of the AACWA.'U Like the
plaintiffs in LaShawn, the Lynch plaintiffs alleged that the state failed to

120. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-691 (1978) (holding that
plaintiffs may sue local governing bodies directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, and
injunctive relief); see also Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 125-26 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (elaborating on Monell and establishing proof of municipal liability under § 1983).
Plaintiffs must prove the existence of a persistent and pervasive practice, attributable to a
course deliberately pursued by official policy-makers, that causes the plaintiffs deprivation of
constitutional rights. Id.
121. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105-113 (1989)
(holding that petitioner was entitled to maintain § 1983 action for compensatory damages);
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (holding that § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses
violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional rights).
122. See Thompson, Foster Care Ruling Appealed, supra note 118, at BI (discussing
District's appeal of LaShawn decision).
123. Lashawn v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 988 (D.D.C. 1991). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 620,
670 (1988 and Supp. 1 1989) (outlining child welfare services).
124. See Smith v. Miller, 665 F.2d 172, 174-75 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating that while state's
participation in Medicaid program is purely voluntary, once electing to participate, state must
fully comply with federal statute and statute's requirements for administration of program).
125. Plaintiff's Pretrial Brief, supra note 121, at 2.
126. Id. at 3.
127. 550 F. Supp. 325 (D. Mass. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504
(1st Cir. 1983).
128. Lynch v. Dukakis, 917 F.2d 507, 512 (Ist Cir. 1983) (holding district court did not
abuse its discretion in fashioning preliminary equitable relief under Title IV-E of Social Security
Act relating to state's case plan and review obligations for federal funding of child foster care
system).
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provide them with written case plans and periodic review as required by

federal statute. 2 9 The First Circuit held in Lynch that the findings of fact
were sufficient to warrant the entry of class-wide relief. 130 In a similar case,

the Fourth Circuit also has upheld the enforceability of the AACWA under

section 1983.1'1 Judge Hogan found the reasoning of the First and Fourth
Circuits persuasive and stated that it would be illogical to hold that children,
as the intended beneficiaries of the federal adoption and welfare statutes,

are precluded from enforcing their rights under those statutes.3 2 Thus,
Judge Hogan determined that under the AACWA the District had created
obligations "sufficiently specific and definite" to be within 'the competence
of the judiciary to enforce,'
and determined that the District had violated
34
its statutory duties.1
However, finding only statutory liability limits the court to granting
conditional relief. 31 In Rosado v. Wyman, 36 the Supreme Court considered
the appropriate form of relief when a state fails to comply with federally
imposed conditions on state participation in a cooperative federalism program such as the AACWA. 37 The Supreme Court held that in such
circumstances plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief and an appropriate
injunction by the district court that would prevent the state's acceptance of
federal monies if the state did not comply with the statutory conditions

within a reasonable period of time. 3 Of course, as the Lynch court noted,
this relief is limited to an order compelling state officials to forego funds
appropriated by Congress if the state falls to meet the federal statutory
requirements. 3 9
Thus, the relief to which the LaShawn plaintiffs are limited under
Rosado could easily result in an ineffective remedial measure if the District

129. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 627(a), 671(a)(16), 675(5) (1988 and Supp. 1 1989) (outlining case
plan and periodic review procedures).
130. Lynch, 550 F. Supp. at 336-37. Counsel for the Lynch plaintiffs established that
approximately twenty percent of the children in the class did not receive case plans, that of
the children who did have written case plans, thirty-seven percent of those plans were
incomplete, that the goals of the case plans were not met in seventeen percent of the cases,
and that seventeen percent did not receive periodic timely reviews. Id. See also L.J. v.
Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 120-22 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding evidence sufficient to establish systemwide problems in foster-care programs for purposes of entering injunctive relief against
defendants), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989); Causwell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9, 18 (1st Cir.
1978) (granting injunctive relief for federal government's alleged failure to comply with
provision of Social Security Act); Barnett v. Califano, 580 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating
district court correctly certified class of Supplemental Security Income disability claimants).
131. L. J. v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied; 488 U.S. 1018 (1989).
132. LaShawn v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 989 (D.D.C. 1991).
133. Id. at 989.
134. Id. at 990.
135. Id. at 990.
136. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
137. Lynch v. King, 550 F. Supp. 325, 343 (D. Mass. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Lynch v.
Dukakis, 719 F.2d 507 (1st Cir. 1983).
138. Id. at 343 (quoting Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420 (1970)).
139. Id. at 327 (quoted in Lashawn 762 F. Supp. 859, 990 (D.D.C. 1991)).
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chose to give up federal subsidies in order to relieve itself of the burden of
complying with the federal regulations.40 Furthermore, if the District gave
up federal funding under the AACWA, the courts would have no basis for
enforcing any injunction it might order.' 4' In one fell swoop, the District
could eliminate both the plaintiffs' right to claim relief under section 1983
and the federal monies flowing to the District under the AACWA. This
action would also eliminate any hope of achieving an adequate foster care

program in the District of Columbia. While political pressures would make
it extremely difficult for a state to forego federal aid under the AACWA,
the finding of a constitutional violation would prevent any possibility that
the District might try to avoid liability by foregoing federal funding. Thus,
in addition to deciding plaintiff's statutory claims, Judge Hogan also reached

the plaintiff's constitutional claim, reasoning that a finding that the District
had violated the children's constitutional interests would insure affirmative
2

relief. 14
The LaShawn court is the first court to determine conclusively that a
municipality violated child welfare recipients' constitutional rights by the
inadequate implementation of a welfare program. 43 In LaShawn, the plaintiffs' principle constitutional claim under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment alleged that the District had violated the children's right

not to be harmed while in state custody.'" To establish a constitutional
violation under section 1983, the plaintiffs must prove that the alleged
unconstitutional action amounts to a practice or custom of the District's
government, and that a causal link exists between the practice or custom
and the alleged harm. 45 To apply this standard, the court first must
determine whether the District's actions or nonactions are unconstitutional.' 46
47
Judge Hogan determined that the District's actions were unconstitutional

140. LaShawn v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 991 (D.D.C. 1991).
141. Id.at 990.
142. Id.at 991.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. LaShawn, 762 F. Supp. at 991.
147. See id. at 990-98 (outlining facts in LaShawn supporting reasoning why District's
actions were unconstitutional). Judge Hogan determined that the plaintiffs had a liberty interest
in safe conditions while in state custody. Id. at 992. This liberty interest gives the children a
right to "reasonably safe placements in which they will not be harmed." Id. This right extends
not only to safety from physical harm, but to safety from psychological and emotional harm
as well. Id. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263-64 (1978) (holding that mental and
emotional distress is cognizable injury under section 1983). Judge Hogan determined that the
standard for determining whether the plaintiff's rights were violated is whether the state
exercised professional judgment in choosing what action to undertake. LaShawn, 762 F. Supp.
at 994. Thus, Judge Hogan concluded that the Constitution places a duty upon state agencies
to exercise professional judgement in carrying out their responsibilities. Id. at 995. Judge
Hogan went on to hold that "[tlhe facts of this case establish beyond any doubt that defendants
have failed to protect these plaintiffs from harm. . ." Id. at 996. Judge Hogan found the
evidence presented in Lashawn to be "nothing less than outrageous" and held that the District
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and that a causal link existed between the faulty
implementation of its
4
foster care program and the children's injuries.
Holding the District statutorily and constitutionally liable, Judge Hogan
ordered a status conference to determine the appropriate relief in LaShawn. 49 Prior to the conference, both parties were to prepare a joint
proposed schedule for resolving the remedial stage of LaShawn.'50 From
this status conference emerged the final order endorsed by Judge Hogan:
A document prepared by counsel for both the plaintiffs and the defen51
dants.'
An order such as that issuing from the LaShawn decision is well within
the equitable power of the court, and is exactly the kind of relief that
courts have upheld in other cases in which the plaintiffs allege constitutional
violations. 5 2 The Supreme Court has enunciated three principles to guide
district courts in exercising their equitable powers to redress violations of
federal law. First, when there is a constitutional violation of federal law,
the plaintiff's remedy is determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation, and must be related to "the condition" alleged to offend
the Constitution. 53 Second, the equitable decree must also be limited to
remedial purposes. '- 4 Third, the remedy must take into account the interest
of state and local authorities in administrative autonomy, as long as that
interest is consistent with the Constitution. 5 5 Within these guidelines, the
court's equitable powers are broad, 5 6 enabling the court to tailor remedial
measures to fit the needs unique to litigation such as LaShawn.

of Columbia had deprived the children in the District's foster care of their constitutionally
protected liberty interest under section 1983. Id. at 998.
148. Lashawn, 762 F. Supp. at 997.

149. Id. at 998.
150. Id.

151. Proposed Final Order, LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1990) (No.
89-1754).
152. See L.J. v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 122 (4th Cir. 1988) (affirming that present or
former foster care children in Baltimore were entitled to preliminary injunction to redress
deficiencies in administration of foster children program), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989);
Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 514-15 (1st Cir. 1983) (affirming preliminary injunction
requiring Massachusetts Department of Social Services to provide each foster child with case
plan and to provide periodic review of each child's case); but see Artist M. v. Johnson, 917
F.2d 980, 991 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming preliminary injunction requiring assignment of case
workers to wards of juvenile court within three days), rev'd sub nom. Suter v. Artist M. 112
S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
153. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 267 (1977) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 738 (1974)).

154. Milliken, 433 U.S. at 280; Milliken, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974).
155. Milliken, 433 U.S. at 281.
156. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (stating
in school desegregation case that once plaintiff proves violation of rights scope of district
court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad). The Swann Court went on to state
that
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity
and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather
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The LaShawn order is illustrative of a district court's equitable power.

Because the plaintiffs and defendants worked together to produce a mutually
agreeable document designed to cure prospectively the District's foster care
woes, the order is comprehensive and thorough in scope. The eighty-four
page order establishes the procedures and provides the funding necessary to
bring the District into compliance with the federal statutes.13 7 Judge Hogan's
order allows the District, with the assistance of a manager chosen jointly
by plaintiffs and defendants, to work on prospective compliance with the
federal regulations. Though LaShawn's final order appears extraordinarily

inclusive, enforcement issues still plague the effectiveness of the order even
if one ignores the District's appeal.

Indicative of these enforcement concerns is Judge Urbina's order in
District of Columbia v. Jerry M.1S8 Judge Urbina held the District in
contempt for defying a five-year-old court order to provide neighborhood
shelters and foster care for young defendants and criminals who do not
need to be locked up in the city's overburdened juvenile detention centers. 5 9

than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and practicality have made
equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public
interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims (quoting
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30, (1944)).
Id.
157. See Proposed Final Order, LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.C. 1990)
(No. 89-1754) (fashioning relief designed to enable District to comply with federal statutes).
The order is extraordinarily inclusive and is aimed at ameliorating the District's foster care
problems in as painless a way as possible. The outline of the order is as follows:
I.
Named Plaintiffs
II.
Protective Services
III.
Services to Children and Families
IV.
Emergency Case
V.
General Assistance
VI.
Placement of Children
VII.
Planning
VIII.
Adoption
IX.
Supervision of Placement
X.
Case Review System
XI.
Caseloads
XII.
Staffing
XIII. Worker Qualifications
XIV. Training
XV.
Resource Development Office
XVI.
Contract Review
XVII. Information System
XVIII. Financial Development
XIX. Special Corrective Action
XX.
Monitoring and Implementation
XXI. Definitions
XXII. Reservations of Defendants' Appeal Rights
Id. at ii-vi.
158. 571 A.2d 178 (D.C. 1990).
159. District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 571 A.2d 178, 192 (D.C. 1990).
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Calling the contempt order "meaningless without coercion,"' 16 Urbina appointed a special master to come up with a plan, including a budget, to
provide for the juvenile shelters and appropriate foster care.' 6' Additionally,
Judge Urbina granted the special master the authority to implement the
plan if the District ignores the judicial order to do so. 62 In that event, the
special master would be able to sign contracts, buy land,
and obtain licenses
6
in the city's name, according to Urbina's decision. 1
Orders such as Judge Urbina's order in the Jerry M. lawsuit have.
prompted the LaShawn defendants to assert that the judicial branch should
refrain from intruding into the daily affairs of government agencies, and
that the District itself has the expertise to manage its own affairs." 4 The
state's reasoning in LaShawn resembles many school boards' positions in
educational malpractice cases. In a typical educational malpractice case, the
state generally argues that the judiciary should not intervene in a state's
administration of its educational system. Although the LaShawn defendants
conceivably could find parallels to their laissez falre foster care analysis in
the educational malpractice cases, the malpractice cases are easily distinguished from the welfare cases.
The LaShawn defendants argue that the judiciary should refrain from
entering the administrative realm of foster care agencies. However, the
implementation of an adequate foster care program is vastly different than
the administration of a school system. In contrast to the emerging judicial
interest in facilitating foster care programs, courts historically have been
reluctant to intervene in a state's educational system.' 6 In educational
malpractice cases, the courts generally look to moral, preventative, economic, and administrative factors and conclude that the judiciary is an
inappropriate forum to test the efficacy of educational programs and
pedagogical methods.'" The courts continue their analysis by stating that

160. Alison Howard, Judge Faults D.C. Youth Detention, WAsH. PosT, Oct. 1, 1991, at
BI.

161. Memorandum Order J at 82-96, Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, 571 A.2d 178
(D.C. 1990) (No. 1519-85).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Thompson, Foster Care Ruling Appealed, supra note 115, at BI (discussing

District's reasons for appeal of LaShawn).
165. See, e.g., Swidryk v. St. Michael's Medical Ctr., 493 A.2d 641, 642 (N.J. Super.

Ct. Law Div. 1985) (holding that there is no cause of action for educational malpractice either
on tort or contract theory); D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d

554, 556 (Alaska 1981) (holding that action for damages may not be maintained against school
district for negligent classification, placement, or teaching of student); Donahue v. Copiague
Union Free Sch. Dist., 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (holding that New York
courts do not recognize cause of action for educational malpractice), aff'd 391 N.E. 2d 1352
(1979).
166. See, e.g., Torres v. Little Flower Children 's Serv., 474 N.E.2d 223, 224 (N.Y. 1984)
(stating that as matter of public policy courts would not second-guess professional judgments
of public school educators and administrators in selecting programs for particular students);

Hunter v. Board of Educ., 439 A.2d 582, 583 (Md. 1982) (stating that cause of action seeking
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judicial functions do not include the evaluation of conflicting theories of
how best to educate, and also that courts are unable to determine how best
to utilize scarce educational resources to achieve these sometimes conflicting
objectives. 67 Basically, the courts do not want the responsibility of overseeing the administration of a state's public school system when they have
no specialized knowledge that will enable them to resolve effectively the
controversies which arise. 168 Judicial activism within the child welfare realm,
however, should seek merely to enforce existing statutes and regulations
promulgated by the legislature. While there is validity to the argument that
courts should refrain from entering the educational sphere, to apply this to
enforcement of federal statutes is to extend the analogy too far.
The litigation surrounding both educational malpractice and child welfare claims differs dramatically both in scope and cost. Educational malpractice plaintiffs seek substantial monetary damages for an alleged breach
of duty on the part of a school district. 169 The damages are purely pecuniary
and the beneficiary is often a single plaintiff. 71 0 In a situation such as this,
the fact that courts refrain from imposing their own judgments upon the
school systems is not surprising. The foster care cases, however, are based
upon violations of federal statutes and are class actions seeking prospective
injunctive relief.'71 All foster care plaintiffs ask is that their city prospectively
conform to the federal statutes. Effectuating an order that brings cities into
compliance with federal statutes is vastly different than awarding a single
plaintiff a large amount of damages. By bringing cities into compliance
with the federal statutes, courts choose preventative action over remedial
measures. These preventative measures benefit a significant number of
individuals, instead of monetarily compensating a sole plaintiff for his loss.
Thus, the judicial reluctance to intrude upon educational matters should
not extend into child welfare litigation.
damages for acts of negligence in educational process is precluded by public policy considerations, inherent uncertainty in determining cause and nature of damages, and extreme burden
placed on public school system as well as judiciary); Hoffman v. Board of Education, 400
N.E.2d 317, 320 (N.Y. 1979) (stating that courts of New York may not substitute their
judgment for professional judgment of educators and government officials actually engaged
in complex and delicate process of educating thousands of children); Donohue v. Copiague
Union Free Sch. Dist., 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that no cause of action
exists for educational malpractice claim).
167. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing courts' reluctance to enter
educational sphere).
168. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing how courts are unable to
adequately evaluate educational standards).
169. See Doe v. Board of Educ., 453 A.2d 814 (Md. 1982) (stating that court would
reject attempt to obtain money damages as result of alleged negligence or educational malpractice in Montgomery County School System); Washington v. City of New York, 442
N.Y.S.2d 20, 21 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (holding that monetary damages for educational
malpractice are not recoverable).
170. See supra note 172 (illustrating damage actions in which intended beneficiary is single
plaintiff).
171. See supra note 29 (citing cases in which courts held that foster children were entitled
to preliminary injunctive relief).
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RESPONDING TO THE PLEAS OF CHILDREN
CONCLUSION *

In LaShawn, Judge Hogan merely stepped in at the plaintiff children's
request to enforce federal and local statutes that municipalities like the
District of Columbia have largely ignored. The District of Columbia voluntarily chose to comply with the federal statutes providing the guidelines
for foster care programs, and courts do have the expertise to judge whether
state agencies have complied with these statutes when plaintiffs present
convincing evidence to the contrary. Because the enforcement of the foster
care statutes is well within the realm of judicial expertise, the appellate
process should affirm Judge Hogan's enforcement of the legislative mandates
which are designed to protect the health and well-being of American
children. While the LaShawn decision is but a single step in the battle to
improve the foster care system in the United States, it is a well reasoned
and innovative solution to the District's foster care welfare woes. The idea
that a child embraced within the arms of the state has a constitutional right
to adequate foster care potentially can become a catalyst instigating an
explosion of judicial involvement which ultimately may help ameliorate the
desperate situation in which many of our nation's children find themselves.
Stacy Marie Colvin

